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MAINTAINING IMPARTIALITY: DOES
MEDIA COVERAGE OF TRIALS NEED TO
BE CURTAILED?
INTRODUCTION
Media coverage of trial proceedings and its potential effect on
the impartiality of the American jury system has invoked tremen-
dous debate.' Intense publicity of trials and trial participants
challenges our judicial system's ability to ensure protection of con-
stitutional rights.2 The barrage of information surrounding cer-
tain trials presents the possibility that jurors will base their ver-
dicts on external influences rather than on the evidence presented
at trial.' An outright limitation upon the right of the press to
cover trials, however, runs contrary to constitutionally guaran-
1 See generally PATRICK M. GARRY, SCRAMBLING FOR PROTECTION: THE NEW MEDIA AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 75 (1994) (explaining history of fair trial/free press debate);
TimoTHY W. GLEASON, THE WATCHDOG CONCEPT: THE PRESS AND THE COURTS IN Nn-E-
TEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 110 (1990). It has been asserted that both professional news
reporters and private citizens have equivalent rights to act as "watchdog" of the public
interest, so long as they fulfill "a duty to gather and report information about the operation
of government and other matters of public interest." Id.
2 See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. Depasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979) (stating danger of excess
publicity is effect on fairness of trial); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). "Not a term passes without this Court being importuned to review convic-
tions ... in which substantial claims are made that a jury trial has been distorted because
of inflammatory newspaper reports." Id. at 730; see also United States v. Cutler, 840 F.
Supp. 959, 971 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding John Gotti's attorney in contempt of court for
speaking to press when he was explicitly ordered not to do so). The attorney's claim, that
the atmosphere was so contaminated with publicity that counsel's statements were not
"reasonably likely" to have an effect on prospective jurors, does not absolve the attorney of
his wilful misconduct after the fact. Id. at 966. See generally United States v. Antar, 38
F.3d 1348, 1354 (3d Cir. 1994) (affirming district court decision instituting gag order to
avoid affect of outside sources on jury); Bruce D. Drucker, Let's Stop the Courthouse Circus,
N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 20, 1995, at A37. The American judicial system has operated in the
shadow of trials such as that of Bruno Hauptman, who was found guilty and sentenced to
death for the kidnapping and murder of Charles Lindbergh's son in what was termed "the
crime of the century." Id. Public outcry and disapproval over the unprecedented amount of
publicity the trial received prompted the American Bar Association in 1935 to remark: "To
treat a... trial as a public show is to cheapen life itself by causing people... to undervalue
the life of the criminal and to increase the morbid desires of sensation seekers . . . ." Id.
3 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965) (noting impact of media on jury's verdict).
"Pretrial [coverage] can create a major problem for the defendant .... Indeed, it may...
set the community opinion as to guilt or innocence." Id.; Michael E. Swartz, Note, Trial
Participant Speech Restrictions: Gagging First Amendment Rights, 90 CoLuaM. L. REv.
1411, 1444 (1990) (asserting that in pretrial period available remedies such as continuance
or jury instructions will not eliminate effects of community bias). But see Joseph F. Flynn,
Note, Prejudicial Publicity in Criminal Trials: Bringing Sheppard v. Maxwell Into the
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teed freedoms enjoyed by the media.4 The defendant's right to an
impartial jury versus the media's right of free press sets the stage
for a familiar courtroom battle. 5 A casualty of this struggle should
not be the media's access to trial information.
One of the basic principles embedded in the United States Con-
stitution is the right of Due Process of Law.6 Although guaranteed
by both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion, Due Process of Law is not easily defined, and has historically
been the subject of a great deal of controversy.7 Throughout its
varied existence, however, one major theme has always survived:
the right to Due Process requires state and federal justice systems
to ensure "fundamental principles of liberty and justice."' It is a
Nineties, 27 NEw. ENG. L. REv. 857, 880 (1993) (asserting once jury has been impaneled
judges' instructions will dissipate prejudicial effect of media).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press"; see also infra notes 17-21
and accompanying text (detailing rights of press to cover trials unless strong contrary rea-
sons exist).
5 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 555 (1976). The Supreme Court ana-
lyzed a great deal of earlier case law to determine whether measures the trial judge took or
failed to take in this trial affected the determination of whether a fair trial was achieved.
Id.; see also Joseph R. Maraniello, The Death Penalty and Pre Trial Publicity: Are Today's
Attempts At Guaranteeing a Fair Trial Adequate?, 8 NOTRE DAmE J.L. ETmcs & PUB. POL'Y
371, 371-72 (1994) (discussing dilemma court faces in assuring fair trials and arguing that
too much discretion is in hands of judges with insufficient power to grant proper relief).
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person
shall be . . .deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.; U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. The amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall. .. deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... ." Id. See generally
HERMINE HERTA MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH AmENDMENT 125
(1977) (describing wording of Fourteenth Amendment, which restricts state action, as cop-
ied from Fifth Amendment, which restrains Congress). These Amendments recognize that
"'no power [exists] in either the State or the national Government to deprive any person of
... life, liberty and property, except by due process of law; that is, by an impartial trial
according to the laws of the land.' "Id. at 126 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess.
153 (1871)).
7 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-69 (1968) (holding Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury applicable to states through Fourteenth Amendment). The detailed
analysis for determining what rights are embodied in the Due Process Clause is not easily
applied. Id. at 148. The Supreme Court noted that:
In resolving conflicting claims concerning the meaning of this spacious language the
Court has looked increasingly to the Bill of Rights for guidance; many of the rights
guaranteed by the first eight Amendments to the Constitution have been held to be
protected against state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. These rights have included freedom of press, free speech, right to counsel, right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and right to a speedy and public trial. Id.
But see MEYER, supra note 6, at 127 (noting that wording of Fourteenth Amendment did
not provide support for application of Federal rights to states, only that all rules must be
same for all persons).
8 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1945)). The
determination of the case depends upon whether a right is "among those fundamental prin-
cipals of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."
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natural progression that these fundamental principles have
grown to be synonymous with the Bill of Rights. 9 Indeed, the Priv-
ileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 10
supports the application of basic constitutional rights to citizens of
all states."
An element of due process which appeals specifically to the
criminally accused is the right to a trial by an impartial jury.12
Guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, 1 3 this right is vital to the
tenet that all defendants are innocent until proven guilty.' 4 In the
Id. at 149; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (holding right to counsel for all
criminal prosecutions is "fundamental and essential to fair trial"); In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 273 (1948) (analyzing whether asserted right is basic in our system ofjurisprudence);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (determining whether right was "of the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty"). One such provision is the presumption that trials
should be open to the public as a constitutional guarantee. Id. See Judge Roger J. Miner,
Eye on Justice, N.Y. ST. B.J., Feb. 1995, at 9 (establishing history, rather than law or U.S.
Constitution, is "ratio decidendi" behind opening trial to all of mankind); see also Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,575 (1980) (deciding trial should be open based upon
historical precedent of promoting fairness).
9 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56 (incorporating Sixth Amendment guarantee of jury
trial in state criminal trials as reflecting "profound judgment about ways laws should be
enforced and justice administered"); cf MEYER, supra note 6, at 126 (use of identical Fifth
Amendment language supports imputing Bill of Rights to States as well as to Federal
Government).
10 See U.S. CONST. amend XIV. The Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States." Id.
H See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74-75 (1947) (establishing Fourteenth
Amendment protections). The Court stated that "history conclusively demonstrates that
the language of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment ... was thought... suffi-
ciently explicit to guarantee that thereafter no state could deprive its citizens of the privi-
leges and protections of the Bill of Rights." Id.; see also, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 170 (dis-
cussing view that federalism does not support rights of states to experiment with
protection afforded citizens through Bill of Rights); MEYER, supra note 6, at 112-18
(describing Supreme Court's willingness to interpret privileges or immunities clause
broadly to incorporate the Bill of Rights). But see id. at 124. "Only one provision of the
Federal Bill of Rights was incorporated into the text of the Fourteenth Amendment and
made applicable to the states, namely the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id.
12 See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 368-79 (1979) (holding there is no con-
stitutional right of public or press permitting access to pretrial suppression hearings). The
Court stated: "The Sixth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
[Amendment], surrounds a criminal trial with guarantees. Among the guarantees that the
Amendment provides to a person charged with the commission of a criminal offense.., is
the 'right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.'" Id. at 379 (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend. VI); see also Duncan, 391 U.S. at 169 (supporting notion that all Americans
enjoy "right to be tried by independent and unprejudiced courts using established proce-
dures and applying valid pre-existing laws").
13 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to... an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed." Id.
14 See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 852 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Justice Douglas noted, "[tihere is a presumption of innocence" and therefore "proof beyond
a reasonable doubt is necessary." Id.; see also Gannett, 443 U.S. at 389-90. To safeguard
the Due Process rights of the accused, a trial judge has an affirmative constitutional duty to
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United States justice system, the jury is entrusted with the task of
assessing all the evidence presented in open court to determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused. 1 5 Media coverage of trials
increases the potential for extraneous information to impact the
jury's decision.' 6 Measuring this impact, however, is difficult, if
not impossible.' 7 Therefore, when a defendant challenges a ver-
dict on the basis that a tainted jury will impair his interest in
justice, judges are obligated to take action.' 8 Courts respond with
calculated measures designed to combat identifiable prejudice. 9
These protective measures are limited by the powerful First
Amendment right of Freedom of Speech.20 The Supreme Court has
minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity. Id. at 390. "'If anything is more impor-
tant than another in the administration of justice, it is that jurymen should come to the
trial of those persons on whose guilt or innocence they are to decide, with minds pure and
unprejudiced.'" Id. at 389 n.20 (quoting King v. Fisher, 170 Eng. Rep. 1253, 1255 (N.P.
1811)). "This Court has long recognized that adverse publicity can endanger the ability of a
defendant to receive a fair trial." Id. at 378. Pretrial "[p]ublicity... may influence public
opinion against a defendant and inform potential jurors of inculpatory information wholly
inadmissible at the actual trial." Id. at 369.
15 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed... ." Id.; see also Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383(1978). The Supreme Court recognized that in our adversarial system of justice the right to
a jury trial as the preferred mode of factfinding is so important that a defendant "cannot
waive a jury trial without the consent of a prosecutor and a judge." Id. (citations ommitted);
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1974) (assessing role of jury in trial as guaranteed
by Sixth Amendment is both to guard against exercise of arbitrary power of judiciary and
make common sense judgment of community available in deciding future of accused).
16 See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543-45 (1965) (noting conscious and uncon-
scious effect coverage may have on jurors' judgment indicates it is highly probable it will
directly bear on vote of guilt or innocence). "Every juror carries with him into the juror box[an interest in all the morbid details surrounding the case] and thus increases the chance of
prejudice that is present in every criminal case." Id. at 545.
17 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554-56, 570 (1976) (contending decision
of court below that publicity may impair preserving defendant's rights was by necessity
speculative); United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 1983) (upholding
federal court ban on coverage of trials and conceding it is very difficult to detect the adverse
impact of television coverage on trial participants).
Is See Estes, 381 U.S. at 545-47 (holding that television coverage negatively affected
jury's search for truth and diminished judge's ability to guarantee fair trial). The Court
envisioned the possibility that television coverage would impair the testimony and credibil-
ity of witnesses and cause distractions to both the defendant and his counsel, thereby, de-
priving the defendant of effective counsel. Id.
19 See, e.g., Norbert L. Kerr, The Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors, 78 JUDICATURE
120, 124-27 (1994) (discussing remedies employed by judges to combat biasing effects of
pretrial publicity).
20 U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The amendment states in relevant part: "Congress shall make
no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Id.; see also Richmond Newspa-
pers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1979) (quoting 1 JEREY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDI-
CIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827)). "'Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in compar-
ison of publicity, all other checks are of small account.' " Id.
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applied this right of expression 2 1 equally to citizens as well as the
press.22 The public, in essence, is party to every trial and thus has
the right to full disclosure, 23 as well as the right to an uninter-
rupted flow of information from the courtroom.24 Only in extraor-
dinarily rare instances has the Supreme Court allowed media
presence to be completely barred from the courtroom. 25 Therefore,
21 See Nina Burleigh, Preliminary Judgments, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 58 (statement of
Professor Monroe Freedman, of Hofstra University). "One can hardly imagine a time when
a citizen's First Amendment right to speak publicly is more necessary than when one has
been accused of a serious crime." Id.; see also CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 239-40 (6th
Cir. 1975) (holding broad court order forbidding all parties whether plaintiffs or defend-
ants, their relatives close friends or associates from discussing Kent State killings with
media unconstitutional). See generally Gag Orders: An Infringement Upon Constitutional
Rights, 133 CONG. REc. H 3381 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987) (statement of Rep. Conyers, defend-
ing Rep. Ford, upon whom "no-comment" order was issued, saying Rep. Ford's right of free
speech was being violated). But see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1986) (sug-
gesting trial court could have proscribed extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, party,
witness, or court official about matters which might prejudice trial, but did not).
22 See GARRY, supra note 1, at 107. "In comparison with the speech clause, the press
clause has often seemed like a little brother-always in the shadow of the speech clause
and often without a separate identity." Id.; see alsoGannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,
401 (1979) (discussing trial court's balancing of"[c]onstitutional right of the press and pub-
lic" against the "defendant's right to a fair trial"). Id.; Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 562 (1976) (quoting Judge Learned Hand establishing that courts must deter-
mine whether "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such inva-
sion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger" (citing United States v. Dennis, 183
F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-
40 (1965) (deciding television and radio reporters have same rights as general public).
23 See Swartz, supra note 3, at 1420-24 (stating public has right to know and through
coverage of litigation public gains information about operations of government and law
enforcement); see also Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569-79 (1980) (ex-
plaining historical openness of courts provides therapeutic value and faith in system); Ne-
braska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 587 (noting that "[clommentary and reporting on the crimi-
nal justice system is at the core of the First Amendment values, for the operation and
integrity of that system is of crucial import to citizens concerned with the administration of
government"). But see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)
(holding national security interest in protecting secrecy of troop movement during wartime
outweighs public interest in knowing).
24 See Wrong Answer for the Simpson Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 21, 1994, at A30 (arguing
news station and talk show host were correct in not giving attention to Judge's request not
to interview author of book notorious for sensational coverage of murder victim's relation-
ship with defendant); see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349 (1966). "A responsi-
ble press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration
.... This Court has.., been unwilling to place any direct limitations on the freedom
traditionally exercised by the news media for 'what transpires in the courtroom is public
property.'" (citing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
268-70 (1948) (arguing there is inherent distrust for secret trials in United States)); Estes,
381 U.S. at 542 (quoting 2 COOLEY'S CONsTrrunoNAL LUdrrATIONS 931-932 (Carrington ed.
1927)) (noting that public should be allowed to attend judicial inquiries and setting forth
reasons why they should be allowed to see printed reports of trials as fully as exhibited in
court); cf Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378-79 (1979) (asserting that closure of
pretrial suppression hearing was proper because judge has affirmative constitutional duty
to minimize prejudicial pretrial publicity).
25 See, e.g., Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 361 (holding prejudicial news items, like divulgence of
inaccurate information, rumors, and accusations are within range of things judge should
have controlled); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 578 (1965) (holding that "in no sense did the
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a reduction in media coverage beyond the current measures uti-
lized by courts, presumably, would be unconstitutional.2 6
Although media coverage of trials needs to be controlled, the ra-
tionale for further restricting media coverage is flawed.27 It is sub-
mitted that it was never the intent of the Framers of the Constitu-
tion to impanel jurors who are oblivious to the facts of a case.2"
Indeed, the United States Constitution does not stipulate that ju-
rors should be unaware, only impartial.2 9 Since the jury is en-
trusted with deciding the defendant's fate, the focus should not be
on curtailing media coverage but on improving the jury's ability to
make a just decision. s
dignity and integrity of the trial process shield this petitioner from the prejudicial publicity
to which he had been exposed because the publicity marched right through the courtroom
door and made itself at home"); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S 717, 728 (1961) (holding in capital
cases "it is not requiring too much that petitioner be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by
so huge a wave of public passion and by a jury other than one in which... members admit,
before hearing testimony, to possessing a belief in his guilt").
26 See Maraniello, supra note 5, at 397 (discussing conflict between First and Sixth
Amendment provisions for capital defendants); see also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 547 (1976). The Court noted that "Ithe unusually able lawyers who helped write
the Constitution and later drafted the Bill of Rights... were intimately familiar with the
clash of the adversary system and the part that passions of the populace sometimes play in
influencing jurors ... [blut they recognized that there were risks to private rights from an
unfettered press." Id.
27 See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (asserting First and Sixth amendments
provide equal protection). The Court explained that "explicit Sixth Amendment right of the
accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the
press and public." Id. But see Maraniello, supra note 5, at 397 (making observation that
courts are willing to line up on side of First Amendment and are willing to make sacrifices
on side of Sixth Amendment).
28 See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1035 (1991). The Court focused on
the media attention given to the trial and recognized that publication of trial proceedings
serves as a check and balance system for the criminal justice system. Id.; Richmond News-
papers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 574-81 (1980) (analyzing evolution of criminal trials from
historical perspective and assessing jurors' importance to trial proceedings before conclud-
ing that jurors should be well informed members of community); Francis T. Murphy, A
Case Against Cameras in the Courtroom, N.Y. L.J., June 30, 1994, at 2. The Presiding
Justice of the First Department expressed the fear that the right to a fair trial is not being
considered with the rights of the defendant in mind. Id.; see also Judge Roger J. Miner, Eye
on Justice, N.Y. ST. B.J., Feb. 1995, at 9 (discussing historical development of open trial
and jurors' role therein).
29 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The amendment provides in relevant part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury ... ."Id.
30 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart 427 U.S. 539, 549-56 (1976) (analyzing previous
reversals attributable to mishandling of jury which prevented impartiality).
"Due Process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury... [and] the
trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed
against the accused.., reversals are but a pallative; the cure lies in those remedial
measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception"
Id. at 553 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966)).
MAINTAINING IMPARTIALITY
This Note details why media coverage of trials does not need to
be reduced in order to maintain jury impartiality. Specifically, it
addresses why media coverage presents a problem to the United
States justice system, how it impacts a citizen's rights, and why
media coverage is justified. Part One outlines the Sixth Amend-
ment right of impartiality, as defined by the Supreme Court, bar-
ring the media from reporting courtroom proceedings only when
prejudice is apparent. Part Two analyzes how courts have bal-
anced the competing constitutional rights of the First and Sixth
Amendments to ensure that a defendant is guaranteed a fair trial.
Part Three explores whether further restrictions on the media's
access to trial information is needed to maintain impartial juries.
The Note concludes with suggestions of measures courts can em-
ploy to mitigate the effect of excessive media coverage on the jury's
neutrality.
I. IDENTIFYING PREJUDICE
The Federal and State judiciaries go to great lengths to secure
fairness so that truth may be ascertained and verdicts justly de-
termined.31 Unregulated media coverage of a trial has the poten-
tial to negatively impact these objectives. 32 Fewer rights are more
precious to the accused than to be informed of the accusations
against him and have the opportunity to counter with a defense. 33
The true injustice of exaggerated publicity is its ability to present
31 See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 102. The purpose of evidence rules is "to secure fairness in
administration [so] that truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." Id.;
see also 62 WiGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1766, at 250 (3d ed. 1985). The theory behind rules
such as hearsay is that, when a human utterance is offered as evidence of truth of the
matter asserted, the credability of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, therefore the
assertion can be received only when made upon the stand, subject to the test of cross-exam-
ination. Id.; see also N.Y. Clv. PRAC. L. & R. 4519 (McKinney 1994) (testimony relating to
personal transaction or communication between witness and decedent or mentally ill per-
son is barred as uncontestable).
32 See infra notes 64-83 and accompanying text (noting views ascertained from news
coverage has potential to be evidence against accused which is not challengeable by de-
fense); see also Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471 (1964) (holding violation of Four-
teenth Amendment when two deputy sheriffs who were also lead witnesses for prosecution
were in charge of handling jury); Joel Achenbach, Ito Blinks In Spotlight Judge's Blunder
Brings Long Week of Intense Publicity and Criticism, WAsH. PosT, Nov. 19, 1994, at Al
(criticizing Judge Ito, presiding in O.J. Simpson trial, for his own media appearances,
viewed by prospective jury members after Ito reprimanded press for excessive coverage of
trial).
33 See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 570-75 (1980). "Trial courts must be especially
vigilant to guard against any impairment of the defendant's right to a verdict based solely
upon the evidence and the relevant law." Id. at 574. The Court found that the risk of juror
prejudice was present in any publication of a trial, but that such risk does not warrant an
1995]
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unsupported views which may affect the trial in unchallengeable
ways.34
Sixth Amendment challenges to a jury verdict which are based
upon allegedly prejudicial media coverage traditionally assert
that a defendant has not been tried by an impartial jury.35 It is
difficult to prove, however, except in the most extreme displays of
prejudicial activity, that media coverage actually does result in
bias.31 In fact, while the Supreme Court has overturned convic-
tions on the basis of prejudicial media coverage, they have re-
stricted this extreme measure to instances when there is clear evi-
dence of a specifically identifiable bias.3 7
The Supreme Court addressed the importance of the right to an
impartial jury when it overturned the 1965 conviction of Billie Sol
Estes, a high-rolling swindler who gained national notoriety in Es-
tes v. Texas.38 The issue on appeal was whether the petitioner was
deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process be-
"absolute ban." Id. at 575. The legal remedy for the defendant is to demonstrate that the
media coverage had compromised a particular jury's ability to be fair and impartial. Id.
34 See id. at 574-75 (agreeing defendant had right to limit press coverage if juror preju-
dice was demonstrated to compromise ability of case to be adjudicated fairly); see also Mur-
phy, supra note 28, at 2. The Presiding Justice of New York's Appellate Division, First
Department, argued that "since it is the defendant who stands uniquely to suffer from ex-
cessive, intrusive or skewed publicity, surely it should be [his] interests that are uppermost
in any consideration of [media] coverage." Id. But see Tony Perry, Rape Victim Fights Back
and Takes Story Public, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 1, 1995, at 1 (emphasizing particular danger rape
victim puts self in through media attention and contrasts with defendant's lawyer main-
taining client's right to fair trial not infringed by media exposure of plaintiff).
35 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (asserting community from which jury
was chosen had been inundated by publicity adverse to defendant); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 551 (1961) (overturning lower court decision where telecast of trial inherently pre-
vented search for truth) Id.; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961) (holding change of
venue insufficient to permit choosing impartial jury unexposed to damaging publicity).
36 See Chandler, 449 U.S. at 570-74 (stating that Estes should not be interpreted as an-
nouncing constitutional rule that all media coverage of criminal trials is inherent denial of
due process); see also Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379 n.6 (1979). The Court
noted that failure to close a pretrial hearing, or take other protective measures to minimize
the impact of prejudicial publicity, [does not necessarily] warrant the extreme remedy of
reversal of a conviction. Id.
37 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984) In order to avoid reversal of the decision in
the future, even a party seeking to close a trial must advance a specific, overriding interest
that the trial is likely to be prejudiced and the court must consider reasonable alternatives
to closure. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 352 (1966) (conceding totality of circum-
stances warrant careful examination of facts of case before decision made to reverse). After
deciding the refusal of judge to take precautions against the influence of pretrial publicity
alone was not sufficient to warrant reversal, the court examined the rulings against the
setting in which the trial was held. Id. at 354; see also Estes v. Texas 381 U.S. 532, 550
(1965). Only after a careful examination of the facts of the case, including the judge's deci-
sion to telecast the proceedings, the decision was made to reverse. Id.
38 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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cause of the televising and broadcasting of his trial.39 The defend-
ant argued that the activities of the television crews and news
photographers in the courtroom led to considerable disruptions of
the trial.40 The Supreme Court agreed and decided to reverse,
holding that trial witnesses and the original jury had been tainted
by the actions of the press.41 The Court squarely rejected the con-
tention of the State that prejudice due to media coverage was not
apparent, and noted that the legal system endeavors to prevent
"even the probability of unfairness."42
The following year, in considering Sheppard v. Maxwell,43 the
Supreme Court was again presented with an appeal alleging de-
nial of an impartial jury.44 This time the Court had little difficulty
specifically identifying the unfairness of the media's coverage.45
The press coverage surrounding Dr. Sheppard's trial, for allegedly
bludgeoning his pregnant wife to death, was overwhelming.46 The
39 Id. at 534-35.
40 Id. at 536 (noting that videotapes of trial clearly illustrated judicial serenity and calm
was not maintained). "[Tiwelve cameramen were engaged in the courtroom throughout the
hearing taking motion and still pictures and televising the proceedings. Cables and wires
were snaked across the courtroom floor, three microphones were on the judge's bench and
others were beamed at the jury box and the counsel table." Id. In addition, the absence of
some witnesses led to a continuance which was utilized to permit construction of a booth to
house media personnel and equipment within the courtroom. Id. at 537.
41 Id. at 536-37.
42 Id. at 543 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). Although the Court
agreed that the normal requirement of prejudice be specifically identified, they noted the
facts of the case involved such a probability of prejudice it was inherent. Id. at 542. "'A fair
trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process .... ' "Id. at 543 (quoting Offutt
v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). "To perform its high function in the best way
'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.'" Id. (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at
136).
43 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
44 See id. at 335. The Court posed the defendant's appeal as whether "[Dr.] Sheppard
was deprived of a fair trial in his state conviction for the second degree murder of his wife
due to the trial judge's failure to protect [him] from the massive, pervasive, and prejudicial
publicity that attended his prosecution." Id.
45 See id. at 335-39 (holding accused in murder case was denied due process and fair
trial by judge's failure to protect accused from prejudicial publicity and to control disrup-
tive influences in courtroom). Throughout the hearings, held to determine whether there
was enough evidence for trial, the newspapers ran stories and editorials that tended to
incriminate the defendant and point out discrepancies in his statements to authorities. Id.
at 337. These articles focused on everything from Mr. Sheppard's extramarital affairs to
evidence that was never found. Id. at 340-41. The jurors' names were published in the local
papers. Id. at 342. Every juror, except one, admitted during voir dire to reading newspaper
accounts of the case in the papers or to having heard broadcasts about the case. Id. at 345.
Additionally, jurors, although sequestered, were allowed to make unsupervised telephone
calls on a daily basis. Id. at 349.
46 See id. at 341 (demonstrating publicity Sam Sheppard was subjected to prior to his
arraignment). Numerous newspaper articles reporting on the case presented a one-sided
view through headlines such as: "Why Isn't Sam Sheppard in Jail?" and "Quit Stalling-
Bring Him In." Id.
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pervasiveness of the communications and the difficulty of effacing
prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors prompted the
Court to reverse the lower court's decision.47 Since the trial court
did not meet its duty of protecting the accused from the prejudicial
publicity which had saturated the community, and the judge did
not institute procedures to control the disruptive influences in the
courtroom, Dr. Sheppard was granted a new trial.48
In its 1986 landmark decision Press-Enterprises Co. v. Superior
Court of California,49 however, the Supreme Court made it clear
that a heightened standard of proof would be required to limit the
media's access to courtroom proceedings. 50 This case involved me-
dia coverage of a murder trial in which a nurse was accused of
administering lethal doses of a heart drug known as lidocaine to
twelve patients. 51 The Supreme Court overturned the District
Court's decision to close the preliminary hearings to the public
and to seal the transcripts of the proceedings. 52 The Court estab-
lished that it is necessary to show a "substantial probability of
prejudice" before media coverage may be limited.53 This standard
replaced the previous requirement of merely proving a "reason-
able likelihood of prejudice."54
47 See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363 (reasoning that state trial judge did not protect defend-
ant from prejudicial effects resulting from publicity). The Court noted that where a reason-
able likelihood that pretrial news could prejudice the proceedings and prevent a fair trial,
the trial judge should continue the case, change venue, or order a new trial. Id.
48 Id. (remanding case to district court with instructions to issue writ ordering release of
defendant from custody unless state sought timely new trial).
49 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
50 Id. at 9 (explaining public access to courtroom proceedings is necessary in order to
maintain both fairness of criminal trial system and essential appearance of fairness).
51 See id. (reporting defendant had administered lethal doses of lidocaine to twelve pa-
tients which resulted in their deaths).
52 Id. The transcript was eventually released and the issue regarding whether the re-
lease of the transcript may deny the defendant the right to a fair and impartial trial was
decided pursuant to Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 620 (1982). Id.
The Court found the issue was not moot on the grounds that the controversy is "capable of
repetition yet evading review." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Press Enterprises, 478 U.S.
at 6 (quoting Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 603, 607-09) (finding lower court acted prema-
turely in closing proceeding and should have explored options less severe than closure to
protect defendant's interests).
53 See Press Enterprises, 478 U.S. at 14 (stating that "substantial probability" standard
is required test under First Amendment).
54 See Press Enterprises v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1, 14 (1986) (enunciat-
ing Supreme Court assertion that "reasonable likelihood" standard failed to consider First
Amendment access to criminal proceedings).
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II. GUARDING AGAINST PREJUDICL PUBLICITY
Determining whether courts are taking adequate steps to en-
sure that only impartial juries are being seated requires a clear
understanding of the prejudice created by media coverage.55 Some
commentators have advanced the premise that, at times, media
coverage is not prejudicial and may work in the defendant's
favor.5 6 In fact, the media's attention to the justice system
strengthens public interest 57 and knowledge of the trial system,58
and shields the accused from the potential injustice of secret tri-
als.59 Cases of extreme and outrageous prejudice such as Estes
and Sheppard, although denoting the potential negative impact of
media coverage, are rare examples.6 ° Constitutional scholars
maintain that no clear evidence exists that media coverage is in-
55 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stewart, 427 U.S. 539, 547-48 (1976) (describing histori-
cal developments leading up to implementation of Bill of Rights); Newton Minow & Fred
Cate, Who is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 631, 637-46
(1991) (discussing justice system's historical efforts to reduce media-caused juror bias).
56 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349-50 (1966) (supporting theory that press
helps guard defendant's rights). "The press does not simply publish information about tri-
als but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and
judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism." Id. at 350; Burton B. Roberts,
Cameras in the Courts: A Rebuttal, N.Y. L.J., July 13, 1994, at 2 (discussing potential for
technology to serve as check on court system). "[Tiechnology now is available to expose
judicial folly.., to a far greater number of citizens." Id.; Andrea Ford & Greg Braxton, Ito
To Rule On TV Use In Courtroom, L.A. Tmms, Oct. 4, 1994, at B1 (advancing theory that
media coverage promotes investigative reporting and perhaps dispositive evidence); James
F. McCarty, Fair or Foul?; Press Coverage May Help, May Hurt Defendant, Oct. 9, 1994, at
C1 (arguing that trial publicity can help defendant's case more than hurt).
57 See GLEASON, supra note 1, at 109 (detailing affect of media on public view of
judiciary).
58 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1980) (quoting
State v. Schmidt, 139 N.W.2d 800, 807 (Minn. 1966)). The Court noted that in earlier times
attendance at trials was a way of passing time but now "[iut is not unrealistic... to believe
that public inclusion affords citizens a form of legal education and... promotes confidence
in the fair administration of justice." Id.; see also Todd Piccus, Note, Demystifying the Least
Understood Branch: Opening the Supreme Court to Broadcast Media, 71 Tx. L. REv. 1053,
'1088 (1993) (quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter, who joked that he "longed for the day when
the news media would cover the Supreme Court as thoroughly as it did the World Series").
Id. Justice Frankfurter explained that public confidence in the courts hinges on the public's
perception of them, which in turn hinges on the media's portrayal of the legal system. But
cf Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965) (arguing televisions in courtroom distract jury).
59 See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-70 (1947) (explaining historical background of se-
cret trials and reasons for public mistrust of secret trials today).
60 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349, 356 (1966) (asserting that although me-
dia coverage guards against abuses of justice by police, prosecutors and courts by exposure
to extensive public scrutiny and criticism, access does have limits); Estes, 381 U.S. at 532
(allowing reversal in case where media abuse was characterized by absurdities such as
continuing case for one month so sound booth could be erected within courtroom to accom-
modate camera crews). See generally Minow & Cate, supra note 55, at 663 (alleging some
courts mistake "unaware" for "impartial" in impaneling a jury and therefore are unable to
reach just decision); Flynn, supra note 3, at 880 (demonstrating difficulties courts face in
trying to balance First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights).
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herently prejudicial, or that restricting media coverage from trials
is presumptively favored.61 Indeed, the standard for proving the
prejudice of media coverage, as enunciated in the series of cases
following Sheppard, has become significantly more stringent.6 2
Thus, the measures adopted by courts have become increasingly
permissive and discretionary.63
A. The Potential Prejudicial Effects of Media Coverage
An accused party may be denied an impartial jury64 unless a
close analysis of the effect of publicity on a trial is undertaken. 5
Jurors, subjected to intense media coverage, could potentially im-
pute opinions of the public and media into their determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused.6 Some critics contend that
61 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976) (reasoning of Chief Justice
Burger that pretrial publicity even pervasive, adverse publicity does not inevitably lead to
unfair trial) Id.; see Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560,568 (1981). Chief Justice Burger also
determined that state courts maintain supervisory powers and therefore there is no consti-
tutional right to broadcast trial live, case later determined cameras were allowed in Florida
State Courts since there is no supervisory power over state courts. Id.; see also Robert S.
Stephen, Prejudicial Publicity Surrounding A Criminal Trial: What a Trial Court Can Do
to Ensure a Fair Trial in the Face of a "Media Circus", 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1063, 1083-
104 (1992) (outlining elements of trial court's alternatives in maintaining atmosphere of
fairness during trial while still maintaining balance between First and Sixth Amendment
rights); see also Howard Rosenberg, Smith v. Courtroom T.V.; No-one Advocated Barring
Print Reporters, L.A. Tnms, Aug. 2, 1991, at F1. Floyd Abrams, a prominent First Amend-
ment attorney while representing Courtroom Television Network emphasized that court-
rooms should be open to the press with the statement that "[the way to get [the] story out
straight and clear and honorably and true is for the public to have more good solid informa-
tion, not less." Id.
62 See supra notes 50-55 (discussing post Sheppard media analysis).
63 See United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1363 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing challenges
facing courts in fashioning proper orders against excessive publicity). A central problem
faced by courts is that they must balance the concerns of public awareness and the desire to
prevent the trial from becoming a carnival, while keeping in mind that the jurors must
justify their decisions after the trial. Id.
64 See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574 (1980). "Any criminal case that generates a
great deal of publicity presents some risks that the publicity may compromise the right of
the defendant to a fair trial." Id.; see also Estes, 381 U.S. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring).
"Permitting television in the courtroom undeniably has mischievous potentialities for in-
truding upon the detached atmosphere which should always surround the judicial process."
Id.
65 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compul-
sory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for
his defence." Id.; see also Estes, 381 U.S. at 551 (quoting Justice Oliver W. Holmes in Pat-
terson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)). "The theory of our system is that the conclu-
sions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court,
and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print." Id.
66 Sheppard v. Maxwell 384 U.S. 333, 345-49 (1966) (asserting jury was subjected to
media coverage which could not be ignored because it was so pervasive and outrageous); see
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 536, 543-45 (1965). The Court recognized the potential for jurors
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trial publicity is the worst detriment to the impartiality of the ju-
ror pool. 67 They argue that the media's response to demands for
information within the community provides the jury pool with a
vast amount of pretrial knowledge, which is not easily distin-
guished from the evidence presented at trial.68 In addition, psy-
chological pressures stemming from media scrutiny could possibly
taint verdicts to conform with public opinion rather than with the
evidence offered at trial.6 9
The testimony offered by the parties to support their conten-
tions is intended to be the foundation for the jury's verdict. 70 Me-
dia coverage of trials may jeopardize the accuracy of testimony.7 '
to bring facts learned through the media into the jury box with "not only [a] possible but
highly probable [result] that it will have a direct bearing on [juror's] vote as to guilt or
innocence." Id.
67 See, e.g., Estes, 381 U.S. at 543-45. The potential impact of the media is greatest to the
jurors, as they are the key to the factfinding process. Id. at 545. Information not fitting into
a particular preconceived story has the potential of being disguarded and denies the ac-
cused the right to present a complete defense. Id. See generally Symposium, The Selection
and Function of The Modern Jury: What Empirical Research Tells Us, 40 AM. U. L. REV.
547, 558 (1991) (hereinafter Symposium) (statement of Dr. Valerie Hans, Division of Crimi-
nal Justice and Department of Psychology, University of Delaware). Scholars believe that
juries form a story with the evidence given to them at trial. Id. Further jurors will look for
any evidence that appears consistent with the particular story formed. Id. Once pretrial
publicity has been integrated with their story, then it is virtually impossible to remove. Id.
68 See Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979) (expressing danger of publicity
concerning pre-trial suppression hearings is particularly acute because of difficulty in mea-
suring with any degree of certainty effects of such publicity on fairness of trial); Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563 (1976). Courts still maintain the "clear and present
danger" standard in determining that pretrial publicity could impinge upon defendants
right to a fair trial but this is not a correct usage of Justice Holmes' original "clear and
present danger" language. Id.; see also MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 3.6
(Supp. 1994). The rule states in relevant part:
A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a
matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would ex-
pect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or rea-
sonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
an adjudicative proceeding.
Id.; see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRne. JuSTIcE FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (3d ed. 1992)
(explaining generally application of selected rules of CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY).
69 See Estes, 381 U.S. at 543-45. Distractions are attributable to both the presence of
media in the courtroom and the awareness that friends and neighbors have their eyes on
them. Id. "Human nature being what it is, not only will a juror's eyes be fixed on the cam-
era, but also his mind will be preoccupied with the telecasting rather than with the testi-
mony." Id.
70 See WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 1766 (supporting theory of testimony as basis for jury
decision).
71 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 536, 543-47 (1965). "Whether they do consciously or sub-
consciously, all trial participants act differently in the presence of television cameras." Id.
at 570; see also Norbert L. Kerr, The Effects of Pre-trial Publicity On Jurors, 78 JUDICATURE
120, 122-23 (1994). Research on the effects of general publicity on the juror pool comparing
three groups ofjurors: those who read articles about a defendant mistakenly identified and
convicted of rape; a group of jurors who read articles describing how the testimony of an
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Witnesses, required to testify in highly publicized trials, have the
added concern of personal safety, loss of anonymity, and stress.
72
These factors directly influence a key element of testimonial evi-
dence: the demeanor of the witness.7a Jurors, faced with the task
of weighing evidence, may interpret nervousness on the part of a
witness as indicative of questionable character.7 1 In addition, wit-
nesses who are intimidated by the media attention may be de-
terred from testifying, and thus deprive the accused of the full
complement of evidence. 5 Admittedly, there is a certain level of
intimidation inherent in testifying in any court of law, and inten-
sified media coverage may further compromise the ability of a wit-
ness to give unbiased testimony.76
The defendant's demeanor, however, could be the greatest ele-
ment of a trial affected by media presence.77 Although not tangible
evidence, the defendant's appearance at trial has been noted as a
eyewitness led to the arrest and conviction of a mass murderer; and a group of jurors who
were exposed to no pretrial publicity. Id. The first group of jurors was found to be more
likely to acquit than the other two groups. Id. See generally Linda Greenhouse, Disdaining
a Sound Bite, Federal Judges Banish TV, N.Y. TImEs, Sept. 25, 1994, § 4, at 4 (discussing
concerns of federal judges that witnesses at televised trials felt chilled and intimidated by
presence of cameras).
72 See Estes, 381 U.S. at 545-47 (noting incalcuable impact of witness' knowledge that he
is being viewed by vast audience). "Embarrassment may impede the search for the truth, as
may a natural tendency toward overdramatization." Id. at 547; see also Gregory K. McCall,
Cameras in the Criminal Courtroom: A Sixth Amendment Analysis, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1546, 1551-53 (1985). "Data from some socio-psychological studies tend to support the prop-
osition that the increase in publicity and resultant loss of anonymity due to the broadcast
of the witness' testimony make it more likely that the testimony will be altered to conform
to widely-held beliefs in order to 'avoid public ostracism.' "Id. at 1551.
73 See 3A JOHN H. WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 946 (1974) (de-
meanor of witness is always assumed to be in evidence). "The demeanor of the witness on
the stand may always be considered by the jury in their estimation of his credibility." Id.
74 See McCall, supra note 72, at 1553. "These camera-induced alterations in demeanor
may, in turn, affect the factfinder's evaluation of the witness' testimony." Id. at 1554 (citing
H. Barish, Remarks at the Proceedings of Judicial Conference on Cameras in the Court-
room, 93 F.R.D. 157, 215-16 (1981)).
75 See, e.g., Estes, 381 U.S. at 547 (noting that televised trial may result in reluctant
witness impeding trial as well as discovery of truth). Id.; see also McCall, supra note 72, at
1553-54 (noting presence of cameras at trial may not only deprive defendants of voluntary
and accurate testimony of witness, but also may deter people from coming forward).
76 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 536, 547 (1965) (supporting general notion that presence
of media in courtroom increases tension of witnesses); see also McCall, supra note 72, at
1554 (noting witnesses are generally fearful of vigorous cross-examination because it will
be on television). Coverage that reaches acquaintances plainly distinguishes testifying in
court from the "mundane encounters" a witness may have with video cameras. Id.
77 See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 73, § 274 (2), at 119-20 (demeanor of defendant during
trial as evidence). Although it has been determined to be too elusive to be justifiably consid-
ered as evidence, the defendant's demeanor is an inevitable part and parcel of the factors
considered by the jury. Id. It would be an impossible task to blind the jury to its mental
notes regarding the actions of the defendant during the trial. Id.
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key factor in the jury's decision making process. 78 Public exposure
adds an even higher degree of pressure to an already stressful sit-
uation.79 This pressure affects the accused's personal sensibilities,
dignity, and ability to concentrate on the proceedings.8 0 These fac-
tors present barriers to the jury's ability to judge the defendant as
they would without the unrelenting glare of the public eye.8 '
In this same regard, media coverage of lawyers and judges may
affect their impartiality.8 2 Attention to concerns of the public and
commentary by the press may alter the disposition of both the
judge and lawyers.8 3 The members of a jury could mistakenly in-
terpret these distractions as an inference of guilt.8 4 Again,
although not evidence, these factors play a key role in the jury's
trial analysis and thus may taint the jury decision.86
78 See id.
79 See generally George Gerbner, Too Harsh a Spotlight, THE RECORDER, July 27, 1994,
at 8 (noting most defendants worry about effect on appearance to public). The ability to
become instant celebrities may affect the way the defendant acts in the courtroom. Id.
80 See Estes, 381 U.S. at 547-49 (noting that presence of cameras during trial was form of
mental and physical harassment, which would affect ability of accused to focus on defense).
The court noted that television and radio broadcasts will inevitably result in prejudice be-
cause they are powerful weapons that could destroy a defendant before the public. Id. But
see Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 573 (1981) (concluding that Estes does not announce
constitutional rule barring television in all circumstances because of limited nature).
81 See McCall, supra note 72, at 1553-54 (noting socio-psychological studies support con-
tention witness will be more likely to alter testimony to conform to public opinion where
faced with broadcast of testimony). Television removes all shields of protection from a wit-
ness because the public sees them in their own voice and image. Id. at 1553. "On those
occasions where camera coverage of a trial silences a witness or distorts his testimony, the
defendant may be deprived of a constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence." Id. at 1555
(quotation omitted).
82 Bernice Donald & Timothy Dyk, Cameras in the Supreme Court; Should Supreme
Court Proceedings be Televised? A.B.A. J., Mar. 1989, at 35 (reporting views of some law-
yers that cameras put tremendous pressure on attorneys, affecting efforts to argue effec-
tively); see McCall supra note 72, at 1557 (suggesting that trial judge has power to indi-
rectly intimidate witness through his discretionary control over camera thus influencing
testimony jury will hear).
8- See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 536, 547 (1965) (recognizing that attention of judge is
seriously affected by television in courtroom for several reasons: judge must maintain order
at trial, supervise television operation, ignore distractions of television crews, and remain
politically impartial in public eye).
84 Id. at 549 (finding media distractions can have direct negative effect on lawyers andjudges by intruding into attorney-client relationship and encouraging posturing in front of
cameras by trial participants). See generally Henry Weinstein, Rough and Tumble Trial in
Court of Public Opinion, L.A. TuMEs, Mar. 15, 1993, at Al (discussing effect of media cover-
age on attorney's concentration, especially when they seem to be exposed to media coverage
themselves); see also Murphy, supra note 28, at 2 (arguing news commentators distractjurors from acting normally).
85 See McCall, supra note 72, at 1555-56 (explaining trial participants are judges and
attorneys affected by how they appear to public); see also Estes, 381 U.S. at 591 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (asserting potential for jurors, ambitious prosecutor, or conscientious judge to
prepare themselves for satisfactory television performances); Achenbach, supra note 32, at
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B. Judicial Measures for Controlling Prejudice
Notwithstanding the free speech guarantee of open trials, 6
there are some measures courts have implemented to protect the
right of the accused to a fair judicial assessment.8 7 These devices
are at the discretion of the trial judge and vary depending on the
prejudice a court is trying to avoid.88 Complete secrecy, however,
is not tolerated by the public8 9 and therefore these devices are
only limitations, rather than absolute restrictions, on coverage.90
Al (criticizing Judge Lance Ito for appearing in television interview while simultaneously
berating journalists for media's role in People v. O.J. Simpson trial).
86 See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (noting some
limited circumstances maintain overwhelming over-riding interest providing justification
for closing trial to public, even where public right to access attaches it is not absolute);
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979) (suggesting publicity at pretrial
hearing influences jurors interpretation of inculpatory information which would be inad-
missible at trial); see also N.Y. JuD. LAw § 218(3)(b), (3)(c) (McKinney 1993) (statute which
meets the constitutional requirement). The statute provides in pertinent part:
Permission for news media coverage shall be at the discretion of the presiding trial
judge... [who] shall... take into account... (i) the type of case involved; (ii) whether
such coverage would cause harm to any participant in the case or otherwise interfere
with the fair administration of justice; (iii) whether any order directing exclusion of
witness from courtroom could be rendered substantially ineffective; (iv) whether such
coverage would interfere with any law enforcement activity; or (v) involve lewd or scan-
dalous matters.
Id. But see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610 (1982) (holding state
statute which barred press and general public from courtroom during testimony of minor
sex victims unconstitutional).
87 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562-65 (1976) (listing alternatives
to closure for promoting fair trial: venue change, postponement, intensive juror questions,
clear jury instructions (citing Shepard v. Maxwell, 389 U.S. 333, 357-62 (1966)); see also,
e.g., Kenneth B. Noble, Judge Restricts Simpson Coverage, N.Y. TnIEs, Oct. 21, 1994, at Al
(discussing closing jury selection proceedings by judge in O.J. Simpson trial). The author
reasoned that this action would violate First Amendment rights of news organizations and
would not resolve concerns ofjury contamination since potential jurors had all received the
same admonition not to watch television, read newspapers, or go to book stores. Id. See
generally Maraniello, supra note 5, at 371, 397 (concluding that fair trials still can be pro-
vided most effectively through continuances and venue changes).
88 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966). The Court noted Due Process
requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury, free from outside influences,
because the pervasiveness of the modern media can imprint the minds of jurors, thus re-
quiring trial courts to use strict methods to determine that the balance is not weighed
against the defendant. Id.
89 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980). "People in an
open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to
accept what they are prohibited from observing." Id.; State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800, 807
(Minn. 1966). "It is not unrealistic even in this day to believe that public inclusion affords
citizens a form of legal education and hopefully promotes confidence in the fair administra-
tion of justice." Id.; State v. Haskins, 38 N.J. Super. 250, 255 (1955) (noting that public
trials provide restraint on abuses of judicial power and arbitrariness).
90 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45, 48-49 (1984) (applying standards carved out of
Press Enterprises 1). The Supreme Court established a four part test to determine whether
a courtroom should be closed to the public: (1) the party seeking to close hearing must
advance an overriding interest likely to be prejudiced; (2) closure must be no broader than
necessary to protect that interest; (3) the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives
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One of the strictest devices available to curtail potentially preju-
dicial media coverage is the gag order.91 Judges use gag orders to
restrict the press from reporting on the proceedings and events
surrounding certain trials.92 The issuance of gag orders is an ex-
treme action since it conflicts with First Amendment rights93 and
presents enforcement problems.9 4 These attempts at silencing the
to closing proceedings; (4) the court must make findings adequate to support closure. Id.;
accord Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580-81 (acknowledging alternatives to closure
are difficult for trial courts to deal with but are not unmanageable). The Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that of the several rights implicitly guaranteed through the Bill of
Rights the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public unless an "over-riding inter-
est" can be shown to interfere. Id.; see also Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,
402 n.4 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). The Court construed the Sixth Amendment to ex-
clude the general public during the pre-trial period in narrowly defined circumstances
when there was "no alternative means of remedying that problem... of prejudicial public-
ity." Id.
91 See Breiner v. Takao, 835 P.2d 637, 642 (Haw. 1992) (finding gag order constitution-
ally impermissible unless serious threat to fair trial is shown and alternatives are ex-
hausted); see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723 (1971). "Any
prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its
constitutional validity". Id. (quoting Organization For A Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415, 419 (1971)); Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362-63. The Court noted, however, that "there is
nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom."
Id. at 363. The Court further recognized need for some action to be taken early in trial
proceedings to avoid possibility of prejudicial news adversely affecting trial proceedings. Id.
at 363.
92 See Swartz, supra note 3, at 1411. "Judges increasingly issue injunctions against pub-
lic comment in their effort to protect defendants from media trials." Id. The Supreme Court
has imposed prior restraints on parties on the basis that First Amendment rights are not
an absolute guarantee, but require demonstrating in advance of trial that without prior
restraint a fair trial will be denied. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569
(1976).
93 Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 570. The Court recognized that the First Amend-
ment freedom to speak and publish, although not absolutely guaranteed in all circum-
stances, did mandate barriers against prior restraints. Id. "[Pirior restraints on speech and
publications are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights." Id.; accord Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 396(1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968); see
also George DeWan, The Bill of Rights, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 21, 1991, at 20. (quoting Jus-
tice Hugo Black's comment that "[b]oth the history and the language of the First Amend-
ment support the view that the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the
sources without censorship, injunctions or prior restraint").
94 See also Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1989);
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581; Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378-80
(1979); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569 (1976) (deciding court cannot
conclude whether prior restraint would serve purpose because managing and enforcing
such orders will be always present). See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders
and Public Access to the Court, 105 HARv. L. Rav. 427, 493 (1991) (explaining right of pub-
lic access to information elicited on discovery would require judges become experts in all
subjects before them and reach decision outside confines of adversarial dispute). This sys-
tem would adversely impact on the courts widened by a recent report that revealed "a
strong and disturbing pattern ... [that] courts are experiencing difficulty in keeping up
with the inflow of new cases." Id. (citing CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM'RS, STATE STA-
TIsTics: AmuoAL REPOr 1988 (1990)). Adding access requirements to a judge's caseload
would be unwise and unrealistic. Id.
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media have met with considerable resistance, 95 as there is a pre-
sumption in the American legal system against restraining the
press prior to the publication of information. 96 In Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart,97 the Supreme Court explicitly renounced prior re-
straints on the press as unconstitutional censorship. 98 The Court
determined that the trial judge presiding over the murder case
had improperly speculated about the effect of pretrial publicity on
a jury when the gag order was issued.99 Essentially, courts are
required to allow the media to report except in the most extreme
circumstances. 100
Some courts use a different approach by using gag orders to re-
strain trial participants. 10 1 This method attempts to reduce pub-
95 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). "'Any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its con-
stitutional validity.' "Id. (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963));
see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718 (1930) (holding statute permitting suppres-
sion by injunction of business publishing malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper
void as infringement of liberty of press). The Court stated: "Some degree of abuse is insepa-
rable from the proper use of everything, and in no instance is this more true than in that of
the press." Id. But see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969) (holding em-
ployer's free speech right cannot outweigh right of employees to freely associate with union
organizations or threaten reprisal or promise benefit).
96 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 565 (1976). "There is no finding that
alternative measures [to closing the courtroom] would not have protected [the defendant's]
rights, and the Nebraska Supreme Court did no more than imply that such measures
would not be adequate." Id. The alternative methods the court referred to are: (1) changing
venue; (2) continuance; (3) searching questions of jurors; (4) instructing jurors of their
sworn duty to decide issues based on evidence presented in court; and (5) sequestration. Id.
at 563 (citing Sheppard, 384 U.S. 333, 357-62 (1966)); see also supra notes 90-95 (discuss-
ing extent of presumption against prior restraints on media publication).
97 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
98 Id. at 570 (holding heavy burden to secure prior restraints not met).
99 Id. at 562. The Court presented a three prong test following Learned Hand's "gravity
of evil" theory to justify an invasion of the right to free press. Id. The Court must consider
the evidence when the order was entered into in order to determine "(a) the nature and
extent of pretrial news coverage; (b) whether other measures would be likely to mitigate
the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity; and (c) how effectively a restraining order
would operate to prevent the threshold danger." Id.
100 See generally Swartz, supra note 3, at 1444 (concluding various interpretations of
First and Sixth Amendments resulted in presumption favoring media unless clear and
present prejudice to fair trial is established); see also Menendez v. Fox Broadcasting Co., 22
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1702 (C.D. Cal. 1994). Defendants were unable to the enjoin broad-
cast of a television docudrama entitled "Honor Thy Father and Mother: The True Story of
the Menendez Murders" on the grounds that the request was a prior restraint on speech,
and the court could not find any of the three factors required by Supreme Court in Ne-
braska Press before prior restraint was upheld. Id.; see JOSEPH F. ScHuSTER, THE FIRST
AmEN~mE NT IN Tim BALANCE 102-03 (1993). The focus is on explaining differing rationale in
government control over trial process between Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) which advocated opening court proceedings to
press on historical grounds and Justice Brennan's opinion in Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S.
596 (1982) advocating opening courtroom to press on First Amendment grounds.101 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (reversing lower court deci-
sion gagging press because restraint was too broad, conflicting with First Amendment Pro-
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licity by controlling the statements made by defendants and their
attorneys. °2 In Gentile v. Nevada, °3 the Supreme Court held that
courts could prevent lawyers from making statements that are
materially prejudicial to an adjudicative proceeding.' 0 4 Although
gag orders on trial participants may decrease the potential preju-
dice resulting from publicity, the defendant may also suffer from
the inability to refute media stories.1
0 5
Judges may postpone proceedings to a later date in order to de-
crease pretrial bias caused by persistent media coverage. 10 6 This
discretionary method supports the theory that stalling the trial
vision); see 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING; A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT §§ 3.6-101-301 (2d ed. 1994)
(explaining Gentile v. Nevada as impetus for change of previous restrictions as incorpo-
rated into MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY to more permissive standard pre-
cluding most pernicious statements only).
102 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1982). The rule states
in relevant part: "A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or
litigation... shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would
expect... [to] have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative pro-
ceeding.. . ." Id.
103 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
104 See id. at 1074 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part). "[Tihe speech of lawyers repre-
senting clients ... may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that estab-
lished for regulation of the press in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)."
Id. The Court decided that since lawyers are key participants in the criminal justice sys-
tem, the state can require them to adhere to its precepts by regulating their speech and
conduct. Id. at 1037; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(a) (1993).
"A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect
to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudica-
tive proceeding." Id. See HAZARD & HODGES, supra note 101, § 3.6-101-301 (explaining lan-
guage was changed after Gentile since lawyers speaking out for their clients may be doing
so to redress wrongs); see also Jonathan Rabinovitz, County Seeks Gag Order for Lawyers
in Rail Shooting Trial, N.Y. TIHEs, Apr. 2, 1994, § 1, at 25. Mr. Kuby, defense attorney for
New York's Long Island Railroad shooting suspect Colin Furgeson, expressed surprise at
being accused of prejudicing the proceedings after a press conference. Id.
105 See Swartz, supra note 3, at 1422. 'The criminally accused have an interest in
promptly and publicly responding to charges so they may counter injury to themselves,
their families, or their friends. Waiting until acquittal to clear their names may not fully
salvage their reputations." Id. (citations omitted).
106 See Symposium, supra note 67, at 561-62 (explaining continuance is effective remedy
for factual publicity but may be less effective where publicity resurges after trial); see also
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRMIINAL JUSTICE § 8-3.3(c) (2d ed. 1980). "A motion for... [a] contin-
uance shall be granted whenever it is determined that, because of the dissemination of
potentially prejudicial material, there is a substantial likelihood that, in the absence of
such relief, a fair trial cannot be had." Id.; Ted W. Lieu, Influences On The Trial, 81 GEo.
L.J. 1321, 1336 (1993) (explaining continuance is appropriate where there is reasonable
likelihood prejudicial news will prevent fair trial). The standard to meet for a continuance
to exist is quite high, as seen by several cases. See, e.g., Washington v. Cane, 840 F.2d 443,
446-47 (7th Cir. 1988) (determining newspaper articles appearing four days after incident
occurred were not evidence of magnitude of community prejudice necessary to overcome
jury presumption of impartiality).
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will decrease the effect of prejudicial coverage. 10 7 The goal of a
continuance is frustrated, however, if it is likely that the media
will resume intense coverage once the postponement period
lapses. 108 Thus, a defendant's right to a speedy trial under the
Sixth Amendment may be impaired. 10 9
The grant of a motion for either a change of venue 10 or ve-
nire l also can combat prejudicial publicity." 2 A change of venue
allows the judge to move the trial to a jurisdiction where the me-
dia has had less of an effect, 1 3 while a change of venire imports
jurors into the present jurisdiction in order to supersede local com-
munity prejudice." 4 To grant such a motion, trial judges must de-
termine that the defendant cannot receive a fair jury trial in their
own jurisdiction." 5 In light of recent advances in worldwide com-
107 Maraniello, supra note 5, at 375 (noting that continuances are infrequently used be-
cause of their discretionary burden and Sixth Amendment implications of preventing
speedy trials).
108 See generally Robert P. Isaacson, Fair Trial and Free Press: An Opportunity for Coex-
istence, 29 STAN. L. REv. 561, 562-63 (1977) (suggesting postponement is least effective
remedy available for pretrial publicity). When the proceedings resume, it is likely that the
media will continue its onslaught of publicity, effectively negating any beneficial effects of
the continuance. Id.; Stephen, supra note 61, at 1085 (noting it is unlikely public interest
will fade in highly prejudicial trials).
109 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (providing in pertinent part "the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial"); Mariniello, supra note 5, at 376 (indicating accused's
Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial is not violated by granting of continuance if accused
made motion).
110 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1988) (allowing federal courts discretion to transfer civil action
to another district). See generally N.Y. Cine. PRoc. LAw § 230.20 (McKinney 1993) (provid-
ing for change of venue in criminal case upon showing of good cause).
111 See Stephen, supra note 61, at 1086 (importing jurors into locale may be reasonable
way to rectify effects of local prejudice).
112 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406. The availability of transfer for purposes of fairness and con-
venience under § 1404 balances federal Due Process requirements of "fair play and sub-
stantial justice" with jurisdiction provisions. But see Paul Hoffman, Double Jeopardy Wars:
The Case ForA Civil Rights "Exception", 41 UCLA L. Rxv. 649, 682 (1994) (asserting grant
of change of venue request provides no assurance that decision was not made simply to
protect four policemen rather than neutral principles of law); Laurie L. Levenson, The Fu-
ture of State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial,
41 UCLA L. REv. 509, 524-27 (1994) (explaining scenario where defendants successfully
argued for change of venue and later were reassigned to jurisdiction where jury pool tended
to identify with defendant officers, thus hampering trial fairness and resulting in violence).
113 See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text (discussing ability to obtain change of
venue ruling). But see Stephen, supra note 61, at 1087 (asserting national awareness does
not necessarily result in national prejudice). Trial courts must impanel jurors who show
impartiality regardless of awareness of case. Id.
114 See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text; see also Odle v. Superior Court of
Contra Costa Cty., 654 P.2d 225, 242 (Cal. 1982) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (noting change of
venire is simple and less costly solution to bias than change of venue), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
917 (1988).
115 See Symposium, supra note 67, at 563 (noting statement of Dr. Norbert L. Kerr, De-
partment of Psychology, Michigan State University). "[J]udges seem to be reluctant to use
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munication, 116 however, it is questionable whether a grant of
these motions would be beneficial in impaneling an untainted
jury. 1 1 7
Prior to seating a jury, the judge may choose to direct potential
jurors' " ' not to expose themselves to prejudicial information." 9 In
making these admonishments, courts are hoping to impress upon
the jurors the fact that outside information may inadvertently
damage their impartiality. 120 But these orders are discretionary,
and even if granted, there is no guarantee that jurors will
comply.121
[change of venue] because it is so expensive ... [and because] judges hate to admit that
they cannot get a fair trial in their jurisdiction." Id.
116 Tuning in the Global Village; How TV is Transforming World Culture and Politics,
L.A. Tmms, Oct. 20, 1992, at 1. Satellite television exerts its greatest influence through its
ability to spread lasting images in a matter of seconds. Id. Not only is television the way
most people experience history, but history is being shaped by television. Id.; Raymond W.
Smith, The Global, Interactive, Human Network: Life in the Information Age, Speech de-
livered at the World Future Society Annual Conference, Washington D.C. (July 1, 1993), in
59 VrrAL SPEECHES, Sept. 1, 1993, at 691. As a representative from AT&T, closely involved
in developing technology, Mr. Smith described progress on the global network as "[a] mul-
timedia network that will provide information and communication in all its forms... and
do it all in a way that's so intuitive-so user friendly-that the technology behind it will go
virtually unnoticed." Id. Judith H. Dobrzynski, Giant Steps Toward the Global Village-Or
An Ego Trip?, BusINEss WEEK, Mar. 20, 1989, at 36. Marshall McLuhan's prediction in the
mid 1960s that better communications would turn the world into a global village has mani-
fested itself today through technological advances and deregulations. Id.
117 Floyd Abrams, Recent Developments in Prior Restraints, in COMMUNICATIONS LAw
1994, at 427 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Lit. Prop. Handbook Series No.
400, 1994) (questioning whether Manuel Noriega could impanel jury of people unfamiliar
with United States invasion of Panama).
118 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 353 (1966). The Court noted the trial judge's
remarks to the jury: "'I would suggest to you and caution you that you do not read any
newspapers during the progress of this trial, that you do not listen to radio comments nor
watch or listen to television comments, insofar as this case is concerned.' " Id. at 353 (quot-
ing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 545-46 (1965).
119 Official Transcript Voir Dire of Prospective Jurors, People v. Simpson, (No.
BAU97211) 1994 WL 577691, at *2 (Cal. Super. Trans. Oct. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Voir
Dire Transcript] (describing Judge's admonishment to prospective jurors not to discuss
case with anyone and to avoid reading or watching any information regarding case); see
also Nebraska v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976) (citing Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 357-62)
(holding clear instructions to the jury may be effective); Symposium, supra note 67, at 564.
The Court stated that "emphatic and clear instructions on sworn duty of each juror to de-
cide issues only on evidence presented in open court." Id. (citations omitted).
120 See Nancy Kornmick et al., Control of the Jury, 71 GEO. L.J. 339, 623 (1982) (stating
presumption of prejudice exists where jury is in contact with parties outside trial); see also
Kerr, supra note 19, at 122-24 (explaining results of psychological studies emphasizing ef-
fect of reading newspaper articles on jurors' attitude toward trial proceedings).
121 Melissa Sheridan & Bradford S. Delapena, Individual Liberties Claims: Promoting A
Healthy Constitution For Minnesota, 19 WM. MrrcHELL L. Rav. 683, 733-35 (1993) (discuss-
ing damaging effect of admitting confessions into evidence improperly). Since no matter
how emphatically the court has admonished the jury, it is impossible to determine what
credit and weight the jury gave to the confession, there is an extreme psychological effect
on the trier of fact. Id. at 734; see also Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 (1987) (White,
J., dissenting) (asserting defendants confession is most "probative and damaging" evidence
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Next, courts may implement the cumbersome but effective indi-
vidual voir dire.122 Voir dires are utilized by courts to identify
those jurors whose prior knowledge of the case would disable them
from rendering an impartial verdict. 123 Specifically, courts may
employ individualized voir dires to promote more relaxed and can-
did responses.12 4 This procedure requires more court time than
traditional voir dire, but the additional time may provide in-
creased insight into jury members' beliefs. 125
Based on the voir dire, attorneys may eliminate potentially un-
desirable jurors by utilizing challenges. 126 These challenges are
the primary device by which attorneys may eliminate members of
the jury pool due to their lack of impartiality. 27 Attorneys rely
against him); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 140 (1968) (explaining no jury mem-
ber should be expected to ignore confession even when admonished to do so).122 See Stuart, 427 U.S. at 565 (suggesting individually directed probing questions as
way of filtering out potential jurors with fixed opinions as to innocence or guilt of accused);
see also Symposium, supra note 67, at 564.
123 See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1, 15 (1986); see also
FED. R. Crv. P. 47(a) (granting courts authority to allow attorneys or court to examine pro-
spective jurors); see also ABA STDs. FOR CRMNAL JusTicE, FAir TRIAL AND FREE PREss § 8-
3.5 (1991). "The questioning should be conducted for the purposes of determining what the
prospective juror has read and heard about the case and how any exposure has affected
that person's attitude toward the trial ... ." Id. § 8-3.5(a). Additionally, "[t]he court should
exercise extreme caution in qualifying a prospective juror who has either been exposed to
highly prejudiced material or retained a recollection of any prejudicial material." Id. § 8-
3.5(b); Tracy L. Treger, One Jury Indivisible: A Group Dynamics Approach to Voir Dire, 68
Cm.-KENT L. REv. 549, 551 (1992) (defining term voir dire as literally speaking truth and
emphasizing goal of voir dire to ensure jury is composed of jurors who are capable ofjudg-
ing witness without bias, prejudice, or partiality).
124 See Stephen, supra note 61, at 1086 (noting change of venue may be viable option to
ensure fairness at trial even though media coverage may permeate the country); see also
Mu'Alin v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 425-26 (1991) (demonstrating that although voir dire
does not need to be thoroughly exhaustive, it does need to be thorough enough to show
impartial jury was impaneled); Voir Dire Transcript, supra note 119, at *16 (demonstrating
extent of court instructions to prospective jurors to avoid media coverage of trial). The
court, however, did recognize the serious challenge these instructions created: "Can you tell
me from your heart of hearts that you will be able to follow all of my orders to avoid any
media poisoning in this case? I truly mean that it is poison in this case. Can you stay away
from it?" Id.
125 Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire; Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. REv.
545, 547-48 (1975) (discussing effect of open court voir dire questioning and potential nega-
tive effect on jury panel responses due to shyness or fear of disclosing personal feelings).
But ef Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415,430 (1991) (acknowledging importance of voir dire
although court refused to allow motion for individual voir dire in this instance).
126 See FED. R. Evm. 24(b) (establishing guidelines for number of peremptory challenges
based on length of imprisonment); 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1994) (allowing each party three per-
emptory challenges in civil cases). But cf Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986)
(prohibiting discrimination in selection of jurors by prosecutors in criminal case on basis of
race); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1426 (1994) (prohibiting use of per-
emptory strikes to exclude potential jurors on basis of gender).
127 See William G. Kastin, Presumed Guilty: Trial By The Media The Supreme Court's
Refusal To Protect Criminal Defendants In High Publicity Cases, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTs. 107, 115 (1992). Justice Harlan spoke on behalf of a unanimous Court when he stated
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primarily on demographics, personality traits, and information
about potential jurors' attitudes when making their selection
judgments.12 Courts generally limit these challenges by estab-
lishing the maximum number permitted and by requiring specific
reasons for the challenge. 12 9
Once the trial has begun, the jury may be secluded from society
in order to protect them from damaging media influences.130
Courts commonly sequester the jury in order to eliminate the pre-
judicial effect of daily media coverage and commentary.1 3 1 Since
the jury evaluates the evidence presented at trial, the potential for
the jury to mirror media opinions is sufficient justification for sep-
aration from society.'3 2 Although sequestering the jury may meet
the objective of shielding jurors from media coverage during the
the right to challenge was "one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused"
and that "[a]ny system for the impaneling of a jury that prevents or embarrasses the full,
unrestricted exercise by the accused of that right, must be condemned". Id.; see also
Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 415 (holding courts are not required to probe extent of pretrial public-
ity only to determine whether jurors are able to be impartial).
128 See Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire An Effective Procedure For The Se-
lection of Impartial Juries?, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 703, 710 (1991) (concluding that attorney
conducted voir dire is ineffective process to select impartial juries and inefficient way of
rejecting impartial jurors).
129 See Kerr, supra note 19, at 125-26 (discussing restrictions on peremptory strikes).
130 See Swartz, supra note 3, at 1439. "Sequestration is the most drastic of... alterna-
tives and should be employed as a last resort.., sequestration.., goes one step further by
depriving jurors' freedom of movement and constitutes, in effect, a form of imprisonment."
Id. (citations omitted); see also Patricia Davis, Local Courts, Citing Hardships on Jurors,
Shun Sequestering, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1985, at C1. Statement of D.C. Superior Court
Judge Fred B. Ugast: "The test is not whether [the jurors have] heard about the trial...
but whether they'll be fair." Id.
131 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 553 (1976) (holding judge should
continue case, transfer venue, or sequester jury when reasonable likelihood exists that pre-
trial publicity will result in unfair trial); William G. Ross, The Questioning of Supreme
Court Nominees At Senate Confirmation Hearings: Proposals For Accommodating The
Needs Of The Senate And Ameliorating The Fears Of The Nominees, 62 TuL. L. REv. 109,
159-60 (1987) (citing Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's suggestion that one way of alleviating
prejudicial media coverage would be to sequester jury); see also Flynn, supra note 3, at 876-
79. In light of the fact there is no way to substantively measure just how pervasive media
coverage must be before being considered inherently prejudicial, defendants should avail
themselves of remedial measures available to them including moving to sequester the jury.
Id. at 878-79; Terri A. Belanger, Note, Symbolic Expression In The Courtroom: The Right
To A Fair Trial Versus Freedom Of Speech, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 318, 353 (1993) (assert-
ing sequestration as one of most common and least restrictive measures available to courts
to ensure fair trial).
132 Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681,
684 (1994). The Rodney King affair as presented by the media contrasted sharply with the
jury's interpretation which had been skillfully contextualized and restructured with an al-
tered soundtrack which emphasized the sound of the stun-dart being fired rather than the
sound of a police baton striking Rodney King. Id.
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trial, the most damaging information, arguably, is presented in
the pre-trial period. 133
Lastly, courts have allowed jurors to be impaneled anony-
mously, by withholding jurors' names from the public, and control-
ling media coverage of the jury members. 134 These methods may
reduce the likelihood of a juror's decision being influenced by the
fear of retaliation or harassment outside the courtroom. 135 Jurors
may not be relieved of their concerns, however, simply because
their faces and names are withheld. 36 Furthermore, restricting
access to the jurors' identities may prompt the jury to question the
need for such secrecy and potentially infer guilt as a result of
133 See Voir Dire Transcript, supra note 119, at *14 (noting that new panel of jurors
could not be called because they would not have received judge's admonition).
134 United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1023 (3d Cir. 1988) (permitting anonymous
jury to be impaneled to protect jurors from hostility generated by public reaction to trial
and further holding use of anonymous jury did not infringe on presumption of innocence);
see also Jose Maldonado, Anonymous Juries: What's The Legislature Waiting For?, 66 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 40, 42-43 (1994) (contrasting view of those in favor of anonymous juries who say
jurors must be protected from harassment in order to ensure impartiality and those op-
posed who maintain jurors will attribute their anonymous status to danger of defendant
and undermine presumption of innocence).
135 See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 907 (1980) (allowing anonymous jury to be impaneled to protect jurors from retaliation
against themselves or their families). There are cases in which sequestration would have
been "no protection in the event of a guilty verdict". Id. at 141; see also Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U.S. 333, 342-45 (1966) (accenting publication of names and addresses of prospec-
tive jurors led to anonymous letters and telephone calls, as well as calls from friends being
made to prospective jurors regarding trial); Jury Pool Small For Beating Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 1993, at A8 (reporting on judges ruling in Rodney King trial that in order to prevent
harassment of jurors names of jurors would be kept confidential).
136 See United States v. Melendez, 743 F. Supp. 134, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (refusing to
allow anonymous jury instead witholding only the jurors first names street addresses and
specific names and addresses of places of employment); see also United States v. Hurley,
920 F.2d 88, 97 (1st Cir. 1990). The court concluded that jurors fearful of retaliation by
vengeful or unbalanced persons could protect themselves by flatly refusing press interviews
when approached and by balancing their 'unfocused" fears against possible loss of public
confidence in the justice system if anonymous juries were utilized on a regular basis. Id.
Jurors may be likened to soldiers who may be asked to perform distasteful duties. Id. For
jurors this includes appearing in the limelight against their wishes in highly publicized
trials. Id.
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these requirements. 137 Accordingly, some jurisdictions have re-
fused to allow courts to impanel anonymous jurors.'38
Judges continue to struggle with protective measures, designed
to provide the accused with a fair trial, while respecting the me-
dia's access to trials.139 Indeed, courts in a highly publicized trial
face unique problems in securing justice. 4 ' Nervous judges, law-
yers, and witnesses, unchallengeable evidence, and biased com-
mentary each require special attention.' 4 ' The actions of the
137 See Maldonado, supra note 134, at 44 (reiterating opponents fear of undermining fair
trial by eliminating presumption of innocence); see also Marc 0. Litt, "Citizen Soldiers" or
Anonymous Justice: Reconciling the Sixth Amendment Right of the Accused, The First
Amendment Right of the Media and the Privacy Rights of Jurors, 25 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 371, 407-14 (1992) (asserting opinion that if judges or jurors could choose to main-
tain secrecy of jurors important information about equity, efficiency, and human effect of
court system would be suppressed). When jurors agree to participate in a trial they must
expect to lose some personal privacy in furtherance of the "higher values served" by open
administration of justice and freedom of the press. Id.; see also Barnes, 604 F.2d at 138-45
(setting forth standards to govern Court's determination of whether to use anonymous
jury). The court in Barnes said: "There must be, first, strong reason to believe that the jury
needs protection and, second, reasonable protection must be taken to minimize the effect
that such a decision might have on the juror's opinions of the defendants." Id.
138 See, e.g., N.Y. CaIM. PRoc. LAw § 270.15(a) (McKinney 1994) (providingjurors may be
asked to complete questionnaire concerning personal information); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 237(b) (West 1994) (allowing courts to seal juror identification); United States v. Pacc-
ione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991) (determining factors to apply when considering
motion for anonymous jury), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3029 (1992). The court should evaluate:
(1) whether there are sufficient allegations that defendants have been engaged in danger-
ous and unscrupulous activities; (2) whether defendants have engaged in past attempts to
interfere with the judicial process; and (3) whether there has been extensive pre-trial pub-
licity. Id. at 1192; see also Litt, supra note 137, at 386 (explaining courts may be reluctant
to conduct secret and anonymous trial due to emphasis placed on open access to all crimi-
nal trials).
139 See Stephen, supra note 61, at 1105 (noting trial courts can use various protective
measures to provide defendants with fair trial). The trial court must maintain the integrity
of the judicial system while balancing the defendant's right to a fair trial with the media's
constitutionally protected rights. Id.
140 See United States v. Koury, 901 F.2d 948, 955-56 (11th Cir. 1990) (demonstrating
actual bias is necessary to overcome judge's refusal to strike juror or entire jury); see also,
Don J. DeBenedictis, Anonymity Now Shields Jurors' Identities, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994, at 16
(stating that anonymity tells jurors that defendant is untrustworthy, dangerous, and can-
not be trusted with jurors' names).
141 See Murphy, supra note 28, at 2 (establishing nervous trial participants, unfavorable
television, and media reporting as well as pressure on jurors to discuss case outside court-
room could create defendant's nightmare in trying to attain equal justice under law); Henry
Weinstein, Rough and Tumble Trial in Court of Public Opinion, L.A. TmsS, Mar. 15, 1993,
at Al. Loyola Law professor Laurie Levenson was quoted as saying, "[tihe more the prose-
cutors are worried about what is happening outside the courtroom, the less they're concen-
trating on what's going on inside." Id.; see also Judy P. Evans, Judge Erred in Torching
Trial, MIAkN HERALD, Feb. 17, 1994, at 1B (reporting suggestion by court that judges can-
not prevent media from photographing jurors outside courthouse but nervous jurors should
not be subjected to cameras within the courtroom).
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courts, the press, and the public are continually challenging the
delicate balance needed to ensure justice.142
III. ARE COURTS DOING ENOUGH TO MAINTAIN IMPARTIALITY?
It is questionable whether the judiciary's attempt to balance
competing constitutional rights through protective measures
guarantees complete fairness in our justice system.143 Indeed, the
furtherance of one set of rights over another may fall short of pro-
viding complete support for a just application of the law.144 Perfec-
tion, although a noble goal, has never been the guiding force of our
legal system. 145 Rather, case law supports the premise that the
judiciary can ensure the defendant a fair trial by fashioning
proper measures. 146 A completely unaware jury, therefore, is not
necessary to maintain impartiality. 147 Thus, the focus of criticism
that the judiciary is unable to impanel an impartial jury is mis-
142 See, e.g., Howard Felsher, A Universal Constitutional Gag Law, N.Y. TmsEs, Sept. 29,
1994, at A25 (concluding legislation is needed to resolve problem of excess media coverage).
143 See Maraniello, supra note 5, at 397 (stating recent court decisions have been willing
to sacrifice Sixth Amendment rights in favor of First Amendment rights); see also Mu'Min
v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1991) (demonstrating defendants still do not feel justice
is being done when they are subject of high profile media coverage).
144 See United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1359 (3d Cir. 1994) (weighing public right
to access against defendant's right to fair trial). The court noted that the benefit from pub-
lic access and awareness of the duties and obligations of jury process are weighed against
concerns that trials may become carnivals. Id. The court balanced this concern with the
concerns of the public that jurors will be forced to justify their decisions after trial. Id.; see
also supra notes 87-143 and accompanying text (discussing discretionary actions judges
may take to avoid bias); see Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976). "The
authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as between First Amend-
ment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as superior to the other." Id. But see Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (analogizing First Amendment rights to freedom of
thought and speech as the "matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form
of freedom").
145 See generally Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 562 (1965) (emphasizing purpose of public
trial is to guarantee accused will be dealt with fairly and not unjustly condemned, but not
that courts guarantee perfectly fair trial); see also Flynn, supra note 3, at 880 (asserting
opinion that defendants in high publicity cases must be mindful of repeated Supreme Court
decisions holding that fair trial does not necessarily mean a perfect trial).
146 See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574-75 (1981). The Court provided persuasive
arguments for not imposing an absolute ban on television coverage of trials in an exagger-
ated response to the alleged danger that some piece of evidence might affect the jurors'
determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Id.; see also THE JURY PRoJEcT; REPORT
TO TIE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 57 (Mar. 31, 1994). One of the suggestions
for improving the efficient elimination of biased jurors in the civil arena was to utilize the
same type of questionnaire containing basic information regarding their ability to serve as
fair and impartial jurors. Id.
147 See Minow, supra note 55, at 638 (describing historical development of juries as al-
ways being composed of jurors who were familiar with situation in community and able to
make fair adjudication of justice).
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placed and should be redirected at differentiating between juror
impartiality and awareness."'
There is little support for the contention that an uninformed
jury leads to a fairer trial.149 Historically, the justice system was
not intended to include juries oblivious to facts surrounding the
alleged crime.150 The Framers of the Constitution had a very dif-
ferent understanding of impartiality in comparison with today's
standard. 15 1 At that time, communities were small and jurors
knew many of the details of the crimes in their communities. 152
The aim was not necessarily to find jurors who were unaware of
the innuendos and community gossip, but to impanel people who
would base their decision on the facts presented at trial.153 More-
over, the Constitution does not require that jurors be totally igno-
rant of the information surrounding a particular case,15 4 only that
they be fair and impartial. 5 5
148 See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466,471-72 (1965). The Court found, in addressing
the nature of the jury trial which the Fourteenth Amendment commands, that it is con-
trolled by the precedent established in Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). In Irwin
the Court held the right to a jury trial guarantees a fair trial by impaneling "indifferent"
jurors. Id.
149 See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 passim (1981) (holding that jurors were not
inherently tainted by education of current events).
150 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547-48 (1976) (noting drafters of Con-
stitution were well aware of jurors ability to remain impartial prior to trial); See Minow,
supra note 55, at 654 (arguing that if impartial juror is someone without bias, then courts
are wasting taxpayers money by conducting voir dire, as it is impossible to assemble 12
people without any bias).
151 See Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 547-48 (quoting 9 Papers of Thomas Jefferson
239 (J. Boyd ed. 1954)). The Court stated that framers of the Constitution were concerned
that jurors would have information surrounding a trial, but it was an "evil for which there
is no remedy.., our liberty depends on the freedom of the press . . . ." Id. at 548; see
generally Rita Ciolli, Can a Jury Be Fair Amid Media Overload?, N.Y. NEWSDAY, July 24,
1994, at A18 (advancing that original juror pool was meant to consist of local community
members who were abreast of trial information prior to being seated).
152 See Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 548 (rating difficult for early trial judges in
finding members of community who were unaware of proceedings); see Ciolli, supra note
151, at A18 (discussing modern jury pool as expansion on original theories, resulting in a
"global jury pool").
153 Cf Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 541-43 (1965) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
532 (1927)). In general, the Court found too many possibilities for the average person to
forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant. Id. See generally Gary
Gorman, Cameras in the Court are Again Focus of Debate, L.A. Tmms, Nov. 3, 1991, at B1
(advancing theory that public does not necessarily jump to the conclusion that arrest
means person is automatically guilty). Seeing and hearing does not equal believing. Id.
154 See Robb M. Jones, The Latest Empirical Studies On Pretrial Publicity, Jury Bias,
and Judicial Remedies-Not Enough to Overcome the First Amendment Right of Access to
Pre Trial Hearings, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 841, 843 (1991) (discussing use of pretrial closure).
Traditional wisdom and empirical data are flawed as to the proposition that pretrial public-
ity can never be overcome. Id.
155 See id. at 874 (noting that recent studies indicate that courts can control factually
biasing publicity and that jurors are affected by emotionally biased publicity).
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Some members of the legal community have advanced the argu-
ment that, instead of maintaining the current openness of the
United States judicial system, courts should use universal gag or-
ders to close all proceedings to media coverage. 156 Advocates of
this method find solace in placing the rights of the defendant
above the rights of the press. 157 For instance, this approach is
taken by the Canadian courts, 158 which use a blanket order of se-
crecy' 5 9 on all criminal trials from the time of indictment until a
verdict is reached. 60 The Canadian press may attend the trial,
but only a bare minimum of information may be reported until the
trial is complete.' 6 ' In the United States, however, this type of
"prior restraint" was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart. 62 Although there are com-
156 See, e.g., Stephen Bindman, Supreme Court to Consider Setting New Rules for Media
Gag Orders, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Jan. 24, 1994, at A9 (noting debate on gag orders issued
by Canadian courts).
157 See generally Debby Waldman & Mary McIntash, Understanding Canadian Bans on
Trial Coverage, INFORMATION ACCESS Co., May 7, 1994, at 18 (noting that Canadian courts
are afforded greater liberty to close trials).
158 See Darren Schuettler, Canada Gag Orders Spark Debate Over Press Freedom,
Reuters Info. Svcs., Sept. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INT-NEWS File
(reiterating statement by University of Alberta professor Gerald Gall that freedom of
speech is considered more precious constitutionally enshrined protection in United States
than in Canada); see also Craig Turner, Trial's Secrecy Contrasts U.S., Canadian Values
Grisly Cases' Details Can't Be Reported North of the Border, DALLAS MORNING NEws, May
22, 1994, at A42 (defending hierarchy of rights by Canadian journalist). "The right to a fair
trial has to come first over the public's right to know every detail of what happened when-
ever they want to hear it." Id.; see also United Kingdom: This Justinian Article Reports in
Detail on the Implications of Thames Television's Programme on the Gibraltar Killings,
Fn . TIMES (London), May 3, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INT-NEWS File
(reporting on television program which portrayed killings in Gibraltar and newspaper
states question is not whether free press is inherently inconsistent with fair trial system
but whether media coverage prejudices juries and asserts that politicians over react to rev-
elations about sensitive nature).
159 See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms), § 2(b). Unlike the First Amendment of the American Constitution, the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms has been construed to protect not "speech" but "expression" instead.
Id.; see also Steven Bindman, Court Rulings Are Muzzling the Freedom of the Press, OT-
TAWA CrrIZEN, Mar. 12, 1993, at All (discussing use of discretionary gag orders on press).
"The guarantee of freedom of the press in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms... may have
actually given judges... a new tool to muzzle the free flow of information." Id.
160 See, e.g., Ontario Court of Justice Act, R.S.O., ch. C-43 § 135(2) (1990) (granting court
discretion to exclude public from hearings); see also CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982)
pt. I (Candian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 2(b) (guaranteeing freedom of press).
The Charter guarantees "freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression," and specifi-
cally mentions "freedom of the press,' but nowhere does the Charter mention "speech." Id.
161 See Waldman & McIntash, supra note 157, at 18 (describing effect of prior restraint
on media coverage in Canadian trials).
162 427 U.S. 539, (1976). "The thread running through all these cases is that prior re-
straints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringe-
ment on First Amendment rights." Id. at 559; see also Waldman, supra note 157, at 18
(noting restrictions on media in Canadian trials).
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pelling benefits to such a system, 163 it runs contrary to the pre-
sumptive openness of the American judiciary system, and is
unnecessary. 1
64
It appears that recently, there is diminished faith in the public's
ability to discern and refine information presented by the me-
dia.16 5 The ability of judges to discount media coverage, however,
is rarely questioned. 1 66 It is presumed that judges are able to ig-
nore what they see in the press and assign the appropriate weight
to the media's coverage. 167 Justification for this dichotomy ap-
pears to arise from public expectations of the judiciary.' 68 Critics
generally assume that judges, possessing heightened knowledge of
the requirement that their decisions be based strictly on the evi-
dence presented in court, have the ability to discount information
publicized by the media.169 Whether a case is tried before a judge
163 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543-45 (1965) (describing how media coverage of
trials makes Judges' jobs more difficult); see, e.g., Murphy, supra note 28, at 2 (expressing
fear that defendant's rights may be infringed upon when media coverage of the trial is
allowed).
164 U.S. CONST. amend. I (guaranteeing right to free press); see generally Talk Back Live
(CNN television broadcast, Oct. 21, 1994) (discussing effect of judicial bans on media cover-
age). Television programs go unpoliced with reference to adherence to judicial orders re-
questing that they do not interview or broadcast information about the defendant or trial.
Id.; see also Sarah Edmonds, Canadians Arrested for Carrying Buffalo News, REUTER, Nov.
29, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INT-NEWS File (describing arrest of drivers
in Canada for transporting United States newspapers with information concerning banned
material).
165 See Maraniello, supra note 5, at 396-97 (noting judicial system depends heavily upon
juror's ability to make evidence presented at trial the primary determinant when deciding
on verdict); see, e.g., Don J. DeBenedictis, The National Verdict, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 52,
54 (citing poll finding 86% of those people questioned thought media had some effect on
trial fairness).
166 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 555 (1976) (stating that it is the
trial judge's major responsibility to mitigate effects of pretrial publicity); see Minow, supra
note 55, at 658 (noting that regular media exposure may increase ability of public to evalu-
ate conflicting reports and thus increase impartiality). Id
167 See HENRY J. ABRAH, THBE JUDiciLL PRocEss 317 (6th ed. 1993) (discussing fact
that law deals with human conduct and therefore, in order to grasp its nature, it should
only be necessary to distinguish it from other factors relating to that conduct). "I have
never known any judges, no difference how austere of manner, who discharged their judi-
cial duties in an atmosphere of pure unadulterated reason . . . we are all the 'common
growth of Mother Earth,' even those of us who wear the long robe." Id. (quoting John H.
Clarke, J.).
168 See id. (asserting belief that law is beyond grasp of general citizenry).
169 See Evolution of Lay Judges: From Kitchens to Courts, N.Y. Tudis, Oct. 17, 1994, § 1,
at 44 (discussing theory that law degree is not necessary to qualify as judge). The system of
lay judges dates back to the original colonies when structured legal training was available
for most judges. Id. The attributes that make good judges are patience, willingness to
devote oneself, and intelligence, but not necessarily a ton of knowledge about penal law
since that information is readily available. Id. These same qualities are essential for a good
juror. Id.
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or jury,17 the key to maintaining impartiality is improving the
ability of the trier of fact to make a just decision. 171 Increasing the
awareness of the jury as to their important role in our justice sys-
tem and the requirement that they base their decisions on evi-
dence presented at trial, will ensure that impartiality is main-
tained. 172 The focus of the judiciary, therefore, needs to be on
impaneling jurors who clearly are able to discern the issues of a
particular case, despite the extraneous information to which they
may have been exposed. 171
From the outset of the trial, the importance of the jury should
be emphasized. 174 Specifically, courts should routinely voir dire
prospective jurors individually in order to promote more relaxed
and candid responses. 175 Meeting privately with the attorneys and
judge will allow jurors to clearly understand their importance in
the trial.1 76 Furthermore, although this procedure will require
more court time than the traditional voir dire in open court, the
170 See id. (exploring criteria for good judges; patience and willingness to contribute, but
not strict legal background).
171 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (explaining "reversals are
but pallative; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent prejudice at its
inception"); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 536, 539-40 (1965) (noting that freedom of press is
subordinate to constitutional guarantee of fair trial).
172 See Minow, supra note 55, at 632 (discussing ways of heightening importance of jury
duty). Limiting the availability of jury duty deferrals for professionals such as doctors, law-
yers, and clergy would result in a better educated jury. Id. Society does not expect to thrive
without the valuable input of these individuals and likewise the jury pool should not lose
their insights in adjudicating criminal and civil cases. Id. But see Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
536, 543 (1965) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)). "The requirement of due
process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the argument that men of the highest
honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice." Id.
173 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554-55 (1976) (explaining that
information about trial does not ineviatably taint prospective jurors); see Minow, supra
note 55, at 641 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878)). "[Jurors not
infrequently seek to excuse themselves on the ground of having formed an opinion when...
it turns out that no real disqualification exists." Id.
174 See Minow, supra note 55, at 632 (focusing on judges role in "identifying, remedying,
and avoiding, rather than preventing partiality among potential jurors").
175 See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 581 (1981) (citing use of individual voire dire
as one way of identifying potential juror bias from media coverage); Leonard B. Sand &
Steven A. Reiss, A Report on Seven Experiments Conducted by District Court Judges in The
Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 423, 426 (1985) (advancing use of individual voir dire as
way to improve impartiality of jury); Symposium, supra note 67, at 564 (quoting C.J.
Mikva's statements regarding usefulness of personal voire dire and his support for its abil-
ity to identify bias).
176 See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 430 (1991) (noting usefulness of asking jurors
individual questions). But, the Court found that the Due Process clause did not require
"questions specifically dealing with the content of what each juror read." Id.; see Sand &
Reiss, supra note 175, at 426 (noting opinions of survey participants that individual voir
dire increased identification of certain bias).
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additional time will allow for a more thorough exploration of dam-
aging biases.1
77
Once seated, the jurors should be given specific instructions of
the principles of law that govern the case and which they should
apply in evaluating the evidence. 178  Questions should be en-
couraged so that the pretrial instructions are clear to all par-
ties.179 This practice will allow jurors to be cognizant of the issues
in the trial and to link respective evidence. 180 The result will be to
enhance the jurors' understanding of their function and increase
their attentiveness.18 '
During the trial, the jurors should be allowed to ask questions
to the witnesses and to take notes during the proceeding.'" 2 Both
suggestions will focus the jury's attention on important issues and
keep them alert by increasing their involvement in the proceed-
ings.1 8 3 These procedures will have the greatest impact on com-
plex and lengthy trials, which inevitably attract high publicity.8 4
At the conclusion of the charge to the jury, the judge should pro-
177 See Sand & Reiss, supra, note 175, at 436 (attributing usefulness to open-ended ques-
tions which are rarely asked in open courtroom questioning); Kerr, supra note 19, at 127
(commenting on usefulness of underutilized voir dire procedure). "Careful and extensive
voir dire is quite effective in identifying and eliminating jurors who might be tainted by
exposure to pretrial publicity." Id.
178 See Sand & Reiss, supra note 175, at 437-42 (explaining how use of pre-instruction
give jurors maximum guidance of issues at trial). Use of instructions allows for jurors to
understand where a potential bias may affect the outcome of the trial. Id. at 438.
179 See id. at 438 (discussing rationale for explaining legal principles to jury). Partici-
pants should be informed of the legal principles in question with particular direction as to
the ones whose applicability to the case at hand could not reasonably be questioned. Id. Thejudge should meet with attorneys prior to giving instructions in order to exclude unneces-
sary charges. Id.
180 See id. (noting that preinstruction provides juries with relevant issues and thus al-
lows them to evaluate evidence in effective manner).
181 See id., at 438-42 (noting advantages from use of juror instructions). The use of in-
structions at the outset of the trial leads to an increase in juror attentiveness throughout
the proceedings. Id. at 442.
182 See id. at 446. Careful attention must be given to instructing note taking jurors that
their notes are only for their personal recollection. Id. They should be informed that their
notes are not conclusive, should not be given precedence over their independent recollection
of the facts, should not distract them from the ongoing proceedings, and they should not be
influenced by another jurors' notes. Id. at 447; see, e.g., United States v. Bush, No. 90-266C,
1995 WL 53167 (2d Cir. Feb. 8, 1995) (examining use ofjury questions). 'Direct questioning
by jurors is a 'matter within the Judge's discretion .... ' "Id. at *2 (quoting United States v.
Witt, 215 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1954)).
183 See Sand & Reiss, supra note 175, at 446-49 (noting that questions allow judge and
attorneys to facilitate jury concerns, rather than guessing at them). Judges in two experi-
ments felt that juror attentiveness increased. Id.
184 See id. at 450 (noting that benefits increased in proportion to length and complexity
of trial). But see United States v. Bush, No. 90-266C, 1995 WL 53167, at *3 (2d Cir. Feb. 8,
1995) (strongly discouraging use of juror questions). "The most troubling concern is that
the practice is turning jurors into advocates, compromising their neutrality." Id.
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vide jurors with a copy of the charge to be used during delibera-
tions. 8 5 This would alleviate the need for the jurors to rely wholly
on their memories for the applicable legal principles.18 Providing
a copy of the charge to the jury will enhance their understanding
of the instructions and increase their knowledge of the trial. 8 7
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is asserted that media coverage of trials does
not need to be curtailed. The litany of Supreme Court cases ad-
dressing the issue of jury impartiality has developed a standard
which requires that courts specifically identify prejudice before al-
lowing the media to be barred from proceedings. Although certain
media prejudices may escape the Court's substantial probability
standard, the protective measures employed by courts are assur-
ing fair trials. While the First and Sixth Amendments will con-
tinue to juxtapose each other, this heated debate forces the public,
the judiciary, and the media to maintain impartiality. The inte-
gration of our suggested procedures into current trial practice will
enable more prepared juries to fill the vital role initially envi-
sioned by the Framers of the Constitution.
Brian V. Breheny & Elizabeth M. Kelly
185 See Sand & Reiss, supra, note 175, at 453. Although generally allowed by most court
systems, this method is rarely used, but it lends itself to the increase in jurors' ability to
address the legal issues. Id.
186 See id. at 453 (advancing usefulness of providing copy of charge to jury).
187 See id. at 456 (respondents attributed the juror's enhanced understanding to their
ability to examine a copy of the charge).
